How does debt capital affect member commitment in agricultural cooperatives? by Luangsangthong, Supasiri & Zhang, Hao
 
 
Master’s thesis · 30 hec ·  Advanced level 
Environmental Economics and Management – Master’s Programme  
Agricultural Economics and Management - Master’s Programme 
Degree thesis No 769  ·  ISSN 1401-4084 
Uppsala 2013 
 
 
 
 
How does debt capital affect member 
commitment in agricultural 
cooperatives? 
- A case study of Chinese agricultural cooperatives  
 
 
Supasiri Luangsangthong 
Hao Zhang 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
iiii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How does debt capital affect member commitment in agricultural cooperatives? 
- A case study of Chinese agricultural cooperatives  
 
Supasiri Luangsangthong 
Hao Zhang 
 
 
Supervisor: Jerker Nilsson, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, 
 Department of Economics 
 
 
Examiner: Karin Hakelius, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, 
 Department of Economics 
 
 
Credits:  30 hec 
Level: A2E  
Course title: Degree Project in Business Administration 
Course code: EX0536 
Programme/Education: Environmental Economics and Management, Master’s 
Programme and Agricultural Economics and Management,  
Master’s Programme  
Faculty: Faculty of Natural Resources and Agricultural Sciences 
 
Place of publication: Uppsala 
Year of publication: 2013 
Name of Series: Degree project/SLU, Department of Economics 
No: 769 
ISSN 1401-4084 
Online publication: http://stud.epsilon.slu.se 
 
Key words: agricultural cooperative, debt capital, member commitment, social capital 
 
 
 iii 
 
Acknowledgements  
 
A special thank to our Professor Jerker Nilsson for his guidance, suggestion and 
encouragement.  
 
 iv 
 
 Summary 
 
There is an increasing number of agricutural cooperative management in acquiring 
more debt capital in order to compensate member equity and achived higher growth. 
At the same time, exposing the cooperative to higher financial risks indicate that the 
member interests are being replaced for other priority interests. Once the members do 
no have incentives to involve in cooperative governance due to their small investment 
correlation to the total capital base of the cooperative, they no longer consider 
themselves as real owners and consequently the free rider problem emerge. When the 
member perceived that benefits could also arrive from borrowed money and other 
capital sources instead of their own investing money, a decrease of their contribution 
as well as their less involvement in participate the governance of cooperative will 
occur. Inspried by the importance of member commitment and the great potentials of 
debt capitals, our prime focus of this study is whether the acquisition of debt capital 
has some influences on member commitment in agricultural cooperatives. 
 
The empirical approach consisted of the theorical framework of the social capial 
theory, the property right theory and the agency theory. The data gathered from the 
phone interviews with seven representative managers of Chinese agricultural 
cooperatives and are used to test the hypotheses in which correspond to the aim. Debt 
capital’s effects on member commitment are measured by five indicators consisted of 
members’ willingness to invest, level of member control, superiority of members’ 
interests, members’ benefit from their cooperatives and level of social capital. The 
choice method is qualitative with explanation and example from cooperatives 
participated while the set of open-end type of question is used for the phone 
interview. 
 
Based on interviews with cooperative members from Zhejiang province, we found 
that debt capital can have both positive and negative impacts on level of member 
commiment by influencing cooperatives’ financial performance, members’ 
willingness to invest, member control, member interests and level of social capital in 
cooperatives. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 v 
 
 Table of Contents 
 
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 PROBLEM BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................ 1 
1.2 PROBLEM AND AIM ................................................................................................................................... 2 
1.2.1 Variables .................................................................................................................................................... 2 
1.2.2 Problem analysis .................................................................................................................................... 2 
1.3 APPROACH .................................................................................................................................................. 6 
1.4 VALUE OF THE RESEARCH ....................................................................................................................... 6 
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY ..................................................................................................................... 7 
2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ................................................................................................. 8 
2.1 THE AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT IN CHINA ............................................................. 8 
2.2 RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT IN CHINA ........... 9 
3. THEORY ......................................................................................................................................... 12 
3.1 PROPERTY RIGHTS THEORY .................................................................................................................. 12 
3.2 AGENCY THEORY ..................................................................................................................................... 12 
3.3 SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORY ...................................................................................................................... 14 
3.4 THEORETICAL CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 15 
3.5 HYPOTHESES ............................................................................................................................................ 17 
4. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES ..................................................................................................... 20 
4.1 CHOICE OF METHOD .............................................................................................................................. 20 
4.2 SELECTION OF INTERVIEWEES ............................................................................................................. 20 
4.3 THE INTERVIEWS ..................................................................................................................................... 20 
4.4 SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................................. 21 
5. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS ................................................................................. 22 
5.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................ 22 
5.2 HYPOTHESIS 1 .......................................................................................................................................... 22 
5.3 HYPOTHESIS 2 .......................................................................................................................................... 25 
5.4 HYPOTHESIS 3 .......................................................................................................................................... 27 
5.5 HYPOTHESIS 4 .......................................................................................................................................... 30 
5.6 HYPOTEHESIS 5 ....................................................................................................................................... 34 
6. CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................................. 37 
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................................... 40 
APPENDIX – QUESTION GUIDE ................................................................................................... 44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi 
 
Figures 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of theoretical conclusion based on Property rights theory .................................... 15 
Figure 2. Illustration of theoretical based on Agency theory .................................................................. 16 
Figure 3. Illustration of theoretical conclusion based on Social capital theory ...................................... 16 
 
Tables 
 
Table 1. Names of interviewees, positions and name of their cooperatives ........................................... 21 
Table 2. Summary of the results of the hypotheses ................................................................................ 36 
 1 
1. Introduction  
 
1.1 Problem Background 
 
Agricultural cooperative is a special form of private business that is important for a big 
number of farmers around the world. By bonding farmers together, such cooperatives have 
helped farmers to stand up to large business corporations, which has improved farmers’ 
wellbeing. During the modernization of agricultural cooperatives, these member-driven 
organizations have been facing all kinds of challenges from powerful competitors and 
unstable markets. In order to survive such an increasingly harsh environment, agricultural 
cooperatives are eager to acquire more capital and grow larger. As a result of these changes, 
remaining ownership and control in the hands of the cooperatives’ members and therefore 
keeping the members committed becomes a new challenge for the managements of the 
agricultural cooperatives (Royer and Rogers 1998; Cook and Chaddad, 2000 Karlsson).  
 
According to Dunn (1988), cooperative businesses should be controlled by the members of 
the cooperative. Such member control has been one of the most fundamental principles that 
cooperatives, including agricultural cooperatives, needed to follow in order to ensure that 
members’ interests will be prioritized. Concerning the ownership and organizational structure 
in cooperatives, obtaining a well functioning and democratic member control has been a 
tough task for all cooperatives. Agency theory explains that this problem could be a 
consequence of information asymmetry, which has been a common phenomenon among 
cooperative businesses.  
 
In recent years, an increasing number of managements of agricultural cooperatives have 
started to acquire more debt capital in order to compensate member equity and achieve higher 
growth. Considering the risk-averse nature of farmer members of agricultural cooperatives, 
exposing the cooperative to higher financial risks indicates that the members’ interests are 
being sacrificed for other higher interests. At the same time, we have seen many cases where 
cooperatives have failed in maintaining a well-functioning democratic member control 
system. As Nilsson (2009) has shown, in line with the classical organizational psychology, 
such undermined member control leads to weakened commitment towards the cooperative 
among the members.  
 
In many cases, members simply do not have incentives to participate in the governance of the 
cooperative once their investments only account for a very small part of the total capital base 
of the cooperative. The members no longer see themselves as real owners of the cooperative. 
Consequently, the cooperative will face more free-rider problems when the members believe 
that they can be benefited from using the borrowed money or other capital sources instead of 
investing their own money in the cooperative. In turn, such a decrease of member contribution 
of capital has resulted in even less power for the members to participate in the governance of 
the cooperative.  
 
Based on this background, it could be assumed that acquisition of debt capital might have 
some negative influences on member commitment in agricultural cooperatives. In order to 
learn more about such a relationship, an empirical study containing seven agricultural 
cooperatives is conducted in this thesis. The aim of this study is to explain how acquisition of 
debt capital influences the level of member commitment in agricultural cooperatives. 
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1.2 Problem and Aim 
 
1.2.1 Variables 
 
Our aim in this study is to explain how debt capital influences members’ commitment to their 
agricultural cooperatives. The dependent variable that will be investigated in this study is 
level of member commitment in agricultural cooperatives. The independent variable that we 
chose to focus on in our study is debt capital, which we believe is a strong variable that has 
interesting influences on members’ commitment to their cooperatives. Certainly, except the 
amount of debt capital, the level of member commitment in a cooperative can be affected by 
other factors such as characteristics of members, cooperatives and industries. These 
characteristics are not considered in this study. 
 
 
1.2.2 Problem analysis 
 
Agricultural cooperative 
 
A co-operative is a collectively owned and democratically controlled enterprise that 
individuals can join voluntarily in order to improve their economic and social conditions. An 
agricultural cooperative, also called in China a “farmer specialized cooperative”, is a 
cooperative that is specially engaged in producing agricultural products. Every person who is 
able to use a cooperative’s services has right to join the cooperative, independent of gender, 
social or political factors. All members of a cooperative are supposed to control the 
organization by participating in decision-making and setting policies. A cooperative should 
also be organized in a democratic manner so all members have to contribute to the capital 
basis of the cooperative and therefore have control over it. Another feature that characterizes 
cooperatives is the independency of the organization and its self-help nature by which the 
cooperative should be controlled by the members. Such democratic control of members 
exposes to higher risk to be undermined once the cooperative joins contracts with other actors 
such as governments or external capital providers (ICA, 1995). 
 
Agricultural cooperatives, as all other types of businesses, need capital to finance their 
operations and investments. Because of the characters of such member-driven cooperative 
business organization, capital acquisition has always been a tough problem. Agricultural 
cooperatives without enough capital are not able to provide good services to members or to 
grow in modern market economies. Traditionally, agricultural cooperatives have been relying 
mainly on equity capital provided by the members, such as member shares, member fees and 
income from market sale. Nowadays, capital from non-member financiers has become much 
more crucial for the cooperative. Sources of such external capital include for example investor 
owned companies, grants from government, other donors or debt capital from banks and 
private financiers. 
 
 
Capital formation in cooperatives 
 
“The difference in objectives between cooperatives and IOFs stemming from the dissimilarity 
in ownership structure suggests a number of distinctions in both the business and the 
financial strategies of cooperatives.” (Condon; Cotterill; LeVay; Parliament, Lerman, and 
Fulton; Staatz 1987) Business activities and operations in an agricultural cooperative can be 
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financed by equity capital or debt capital, or a combination of these two forms of capital. 
Capital formation in cooperatives is regarded as a means of increasing member participation 
and control” (COPAC, 1995).  
 
The sources where cooperative can obtain capital from can be divided into two categories, 
internal and external. External capital formation arises when cooperatives recived debt or 
equity from sources outside of the cooperative such as government, non-member investors, 
cooperative banks, commercial banks etc. Equity capital is the risk capital, or net worth of the 
organization and it represents the members' ownership in the total assets of the organization. 
In balance sheet terms, equity is total assets less total liabilities. Cooperative equity comes in 
two forms, allocated and unallocated. Allocated equity is assigned proportionally to members 
and unallocated equity is not. 
 
Traditionally, most cooperatives raise equity capital by requiring members to make direct 
investments in the cooperative business. It is most often used when a new member joins the 
cooperative and he or she has to make a purchase of equity carrying a voting right. Members’ 
financial contribution in the form of direct investment is also needed for acquiring additional 
member equity when the cooperative needs to strengthen its financial condition. Such 
member equity could also be seen as a demonstration of member commitment. Sometimes, 
there are also possibilities to allow non-members to make direct investments as a way to 
supplement member equity. These investments, usually in the form of preferred stock, often 
pay a favorable dividend, but do not usually provide a voting right. Additionally, equity 
capital can also be raised by income surplus generated from selling outputs.  
 
It is desirable for the cooperatives to have a larger share of equity capital compare to the 
amount of debt capital in the cooperative. A strong member equity base is an important factor 
that indicates that the cooperative is financially strong and it gives the members more power 
to control the operation of the cooperative. Unfortunately, members in agricultural 
cooperatives have very often difficulties to make investments that are large enough to obtain 
an adequate equity base in their cooperatives. Even though there are other methods that may 
be used to obtain equity such as retaining earnings; it is common that agricultural 
cooperatives suffer from starving equity basis.  
 
Shortage of equity in cooperatives will have undesirable influences on financial performance 
and growth in the cooperatives (Schrader, 1989). In order to meet the cooperatives’ capital 
needs, cooperatives may try to use an increased portion of debt capital to compensate for the 
shortage of equity capital. Debt capital refers to the money borrowed from a lender that the 
principal and interest need to be repaid at a certain time. A large proportion of debt in the 
capital structure represents high financial risks for any business, including cooperatives. 
Failure in paying back the borrowed money can lead to that lenders taking over control of the 
cooperative. Considering the fact that many farmer-members join cooperatives to reduce risks 
of their farming activities, an acquisition of debt capital might make members worried and 
suspicious whether their cooperative is still working for the members’ interests. Additionally, 
a large debt results in high interest costs, which negatively affect the profitability of the 
business (Peterson and Cobia, 2000). Members’ interests might be neglected when trying to 
pay back the loans and interests.  
 
However, although both banks and private financiers in many cases provide the cooperatives 
opportunities to borrow money, not all cooperatives fulfill the requirements for the loans in 
the form of collaterals, personal guarantees or historical profits.  A number of previous studies 
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concluded that cooperative firms tend to have little debt capital (Lerman, 1993). Such 
behavior could be attributed to that the lending institutions usually feel uncomfortable with 
the cooperatives’ ownership structure. In fact, many investor-owned firms also have the same 
problems when trying to borrow money or obtain higher owner (member) equity. The solution 
that they often use is to obtain equity from investors outside the firm. Traditionally, such non-
member equity has not always been considered by cooperatives and potential investors as an 
appropriate capital source for cooperatives.  
 
When a cooperative uses capital generated by members and retained earnings as its primary 
capital source, the cooperative does not face any problems with debt risks of not being able to 
pay back the money. On the other hand, it has been suggested that a capital accumulation of 
very much internal capital and very little debt capital could lead to unnecessarily high capital 
cost. An overuse of institutional capital, which refers to the collectively owned non-
refundable capital, could also result in emergence of perverse incentives (Murray, 1983). 
However, Mcbride (1986) claims that there are many examples of successful agricultural 
cooperatives using a well-balanced mixture of member equity and debt capital. 
 
 
Debt capital in cooperatives  
 
Based on the effects that different capital sources could have on the performance of the 
cooperatives, there is a qualitative dimension of different types of capital. The quality of 
certain type of capital source is determined by the so-called “cooperative power” which 
indicates such capital’s ability to strengthen member participation and control in the 
cooperative (COPAC, 1995). According to Von Pischke (1993), those forms of capital that 
are attached with conditions and terms that demands a strong member commitment should be 
perceived as capital of high quality.  
 
Generally, capital from internal sources such as revolving fund has better quality than debt 
capital and other external capital since the members are involved as investors and no 
influences from non-members financiers. According to Eze (1990), the more involved the 
members feel they are in the development of the cooperative, the easier for the cooperative 
organization to achieve efficiency. Unfortunately, most forms of loans from banks and private 
financiers will give the lenders either formal or informal power to influence the decision-
making in the cooperative. As a consequence of that, at the same time as the debt capital helps 
the cooperative to enlarge investment, the member control and participation in the cooperative 
will be weakened. 
 
Except that, it is very likely that the non-member financiers will try to influence the decisions 
in a way that maximizes their own benefits which obviously violates the members’ interests 
and therefore the cooperative principles. Such a degradation of member control in the 
governance of the cooperative will have negative impact on the members’ commitment to the 
cooperative (Österberg and Nilsson, 2009). Thereafter, the mutual effect between member 
control and commitment will make the members even less engaged to spend time and efforts 
to involve in the governance of the cooperative and a vicious spiral arises (Bijman, 2011). 
Another type of external capital is grants and it is perceived as the external capital with lowest 
quality due to the high risk for creating cost inefficiency and dependency in the cooperative. 
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Member control and commitment in cooperatives 
 
The level of member commitment indicates members’ preference to maintain a member 
relationship with the cooperative and continue doing business with it when there are other 
business options available (Fulton, 1999). As mentioned before, agricultural cooperatives are 
formed to enhance farmer-members’ wellbeing, which means that cooperatives have to 
provide services that are desired by the members. In order to achieve that, a democratic 
governance system is crucial in which members can control the cooperative and support those 
decisions that are beneficial for them (Bhuyan, 2007; Gray & Kraenzle, 1998). Once such 
member control is implemented and members start having influence on decisions, it is easier 
for them to be committed and supportive to the decisions made by managers of the 
cooperative (Nilsson, 2009). Level of member control in a cooperative can be the single most 
important factor that affects member commitment (Österberg and Nilsson, 2009). Together 
with other important conditions, member commitment in cooperatives needs to be maintained 
in order to achieve long-term success (Anderson & Henehan, 2005; Staatz, 1989). 
 
Considering the fact that members can have different roles in the cooperative, a strong 
member commitment can be crucial in many different ways (Österberg and Nilsson, 2009). 
Committed members are more likely to use their rights to make sure that qualified candidates 
will be elected in the board and the management and the board performs at a high standard 
and serves the interests of the members. Members with high commitment are usually better at 
understanding decisions from the managers and therefore willing to support them.  
 
As mention before, most agricultural cooperatives highly rely on their members’ financial 
contributions as a crucial internal capital source. Hence, level of member commitment in 
cooperative will influence the internal capital formation and therefore the financial power of 
the cooperative (ibid). According to Reynolds (1997), those members lacking commitment to 
the cooperative are usually not committed to the decisions made by the board either and a lack 
of such support and understanding between members and the board will make the 
implementation of those decisions become more complicated. 
 
Unfortunately, as agricultural cooperatives’ business and member base grow larger, many 
cooperatives experience a decreased level of member commitment in their organizations 
(Bhuyan, 2007; Fulton, 1995; Lang and Fulton, 2004; Fulton and Giannakas, 2007). This 
trend is expected to be exacerbated due to rapidly increasing pressures on future economic 
performance. Members’ commitment to their cooperative might be influenced by many 
different factors. For instance, the larger the members’ investments in the cooperative, the 
greater commitment members will have toward their cooperative.  
 
Member commitment could also be dependent on other characteristics of members such as 
age, education and communication with the organization. Characteristics of the cooperative 
such as type of cooperative, formation of capital base, debt to equity ratio, level of economic 
returns to farmer-members and how cooperative revolves equity also have systematic impact 
on the level of member commitment (Trechter, 2002). Despite an undermined member 
control, if an external capital formation can lead to higher economic returns to farmer-
members, members’ commitment to the cooperative may be positively influenced. 
 
This dilemma will probably not occur if the cooperatives make sure that decision power over 
new investments would not be switched to debt providers. On the other hand, if the same level 
of control will be retained with the members after receiving funds from non-member 
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financiers, they will not have confidence that their money will be spent well. Consequently, 
an organizational structure where a high member control is strictly prioritized will give 
outside financiers little incentives to invest money and will lead to unfavorable terms on 
outside equity compare to those faced by conventional firms (Hendrikse and Veerman, 2001).  
 
 
Aim of the study 
 
Member commitment in agricultural cooperatives has been a frequently discussed topic. A 
large number of studies have been conducted in this area. Capital formation of agricultural 
cooperatives has also been focused in many studies considering its importance for agricultural 
cooperatives.  
 
In China, many studies have argued for debt capital’s potential to stimulate the development 
of agricultural cooperatives in China. Debt capital has become more and more considered and 
promoted as one of the most important capital sources that can provide Chinese agricultural 
cooperatives with opportunities to improve their performances and achieve higher growth. 
However, despite such substantiated importance of member commitment and debt capital for 
cooperative businesses, we could not find any studies that explain how debt capital would 
affect member commitment in agricultural cooperatives. 
 
The discussions above can be summarized into a more specified statement of the aim of this 
study:  
 
The aim of this thesis is to clarify how debt capital in agricultural cooperatives affects 
member commitment in these cooperatives.  
 
 
1.3 Approach 
 
This study concerns whether debt capital has an influence on member commitment to the 
cooperatives. The background information provides the basic understanding of agricultural 
cooperatives in China and the theoretical framework gives the knowledge for an analysis of 
the finding from the interviews. 
 
The empirical data in this study are gathered from interviews with representative managers of 
Chinese agricultural cooperatives. Data are used to test five theoretically derived hypotheses. 
After the data is analyzed in relation to the hypotheses conclusions are presented which 
correspond to the hypotheses and the purpose.  
 
 
1.4 Value of the research 
 
Much research has been focused on the difficulties, importance and approaches of external 
capital formation in general in agricultural cooperatives. With inspirations from these 
interesting studies, we hope that our research could improve the understanding of how the 
cooperatives´ member commitment could be affected by acquisition of debt capital in an 
agricultural cooperative. The findings could be useful for the managers and members in 
agricultural cooperatives once they face the question whether they should raise the level of 
debt capital in the cooperative. For those who have decided to do so, we hope that our 
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findings could make it easier for them to prepare for the possible effects on the cooperative 
caused by the acquisition of debt capital. Additionally, the findings should also be valuable 
for outside actors, which provide debt capital to agricultural cooperatives such as commercial 
banks, cooperative banks, private lenders and government authorities. An improved 
understanding of debt capital`s effects on level of member commitment in the cooperative 
could enable these important outside actors to provide financial supports in a more sufficient 
way. 
 
 
1.5 Structure of the study 
 
This section provides a brief overview of the structure of this study. 
 
Chapter 1 provides a formulation and an analysis of the aim and problem in this study and 
chapter 2 gives background information about the agricultural cooperatives in China. In the 
third chapter, the theories and the hypotheses will be presented followed by a discussion of 
the connections between them. The method of data collection and the test of the hypotheses 
will be discussed in chapter 4. Chapter 5 consists of a presentation and analysis of the 
empirical data followed by the chapter 6 in which the conclusions of this study will be 
presented and discussed. 
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2. Background information   
 
2.1 The agricultural cooperative movement in China 
 
Farmer cooperative organizations have been created quietly in rural areas in China since the 
1980s and have started growing afterward. Chinese farmer co-operatives have been 
developing rapidly since the 2000s especially when the promulgation of Farmer Specialized 
Co-operative Law in 2007 (Xu and Wu, 2009). China has more than 150,000 agricultural 
cooperatives which consist of 38,780,000 members of which 34,860,000 members are 
farmers. These farmer cooperative members accounted for 13.8% of total number of national 
farmers in China (Ministry of Agriculture China, 2008).  
 
Farmer cooperatives have been constantly increasing in number following the Law of Farmer 
Co-operatives was declared in 2007. In accordance with the National Industrial and 
Commerce Bureau’s statistics, the number of registered farmer cooperatives was 440,000 by 
mid 2011 representing 20 million rural households. However, the number of farmer 
cooperatives will not yet stop growing considering the low persentage of the total population 
of farmers that has engaged in cooperative enterprises so far. According to taxation 
registration, cooperatives can be characterized as many types of firms, for instance, private 
partnership firm, co-operative-shareholding enterprises, limited liability companies, 
individual households, collective enterprises. Some scholars suggested that the real figure of 
cooperatives in China should be observed from the cooperative registrations (Yuan, 2001).  
 
The development of Chinese farmer cooperatives has undergone three phases. During the mid 
of 1980s to the mid of 1990s, the establishment of household contract system and rural 
specialized households improved the technical and information services that were available to 
the farmers. Naturally, the cooperative professional organization has also established. In the 
late 80s to early 90s, Farmers have joined the market in accordance with an objective 
requirement of China’s rural economic reform and development of market economy in which 
the professional association has provided member involved services, for instance warehousing 
and distribution (Ministry of Agriculture China, 2008).  
 
The cooperatives in China have had a period of rapid transformation and development during 
the latest two decades. Cooperative businesses have been receiving more and more attention 
and support from the government and other public actors. As the cooperatives in many other 
developing countries, the cooperatives in China have been facing capital shortage problems 
during the transformation. This dilemma has constantly been a hinder for the cooperatives to 
grow and make greater contributions to the transformation of agriculture and rural 
developments in China. However, even though internally generated capital is often perceived 
as having higher quality than debt capital, previous research indicate that an increasing 
number of agricultural cooperatives in China have started making efforts to implement more 
modern and innovative strategies to mobilize capital from external sources to finance their 
activities and growth. However, managers in Chinese agricultural cooperatives have 
discovered the potentials and possibilities associated with debt capital sources. Additionally, 
political and economic efforts have been made to help cooperatives to overcome difficulties 
when borrowing money from banks. Hence, the proportion of debt capital in the total capital 
portfolio of agricultural cooperatives is expected to remain increasing. 
 
 9 
In the late 1990s, China’s agriculture and rural economy has experienced a new stage of 
development where the agricultural products have yielded a surplus after a long period of 
food shortages, difficulties in selling agricultural products and slow growth of farmers’ 
income. Government solved such difficulty by supporting farmers to voluntarily engage in 
cooperatives and professional associations. These specialized cooperatives have been 
involved in various activities from fruits and vegetables, livestock, aquaculture, forestry, 
agricultural services, transportation, grain and oil crops, water reservation, resource 
development, and handicraft production (ibid). 
 
After the declaration of Farmers’ Professional Cooperative Law in October 31, 2006, the 
farmer cooperatives were constructed in accordance to the new law implying such things as 
the improvement of internal management, strengthening democratic, open up markets for 
agricultural products, and constantly improving the service features (ibid). 
 
The concept of agricultural cooperative in China is the consequence of prolonged process of 
political and economic development to boost income and ensure food security for people. The 
government started off the policy with the commune system where later converted to 
collective system in which expecting farmer members to deliver food for the state. To meet 
the demand for freedom of action and decision making, the collectives gradually transformed 
into agricultural cooperatives (Prakash, 2002). The agricultural cooperatives in China can be 
divided into professional cooperatives and professional associations (Chinese Ministry of 
Agriculture, 2008). The most fundamental difference between these two types of organization 
is that the professional associations have to be nonprofit organizations. 
 
 
2.2 Recent development in the agricultural cooperative movement in 
China 
 
According to the development after China’s market become more open and the reformation of 
institutional framework for farmers; Chinese government has improved the new version of 
cooperative development. Over the reform process in China, a continuous great change 
process has taken place in the rural economy and farmer cooperatives. Farmers have 
voluntarily joined the cooperative organization with the aim of developing the economy and 
operate under the basis of ‘from the farmer, by the farmer and for the farmer’ (Prakash, 2002).  
 
The emergence and development of professional cooperative organization become gradually 
necessary during the changing from traditionally planned economic system into socialist 
marketing economic system. The reformation of marketing mechanism and procurement of 
agricultural products allowed the farmers to interact with market more easily. Further, such 
mechanism helps farmers adopt the new technologies faster, stocking of pre and post harvest 
to secure against risks, improve the production system to maximize resource and to raise 
income (ibid).  
 
The process of development has now established more professional economic organization of 
farmers where they can earn higher income by the introduction of higher technology. The new 
forms of agricultural cooperatives after the reformation of the market maintain the 
autonomous rights of farmers where they can play various professional roles following their 
wills and becoming more professional. The organization structure and management is 
democratic and more independent in the decision-making processes. Cooperatives offer 
 10 
extended services required by farmer-members and profit distributed among members. Thus, 
all of these positive changes lead to an increased standard of living (ibid).  
 
There are some major progresses and noticeable achievements made by Chinese farmer 
cooperatives and Government: 
 
1) The establishment of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Farmers’ Specialized 
Cooperatives in October 31, 2006 is the major change. The law allows the legal persons of 
farmer cooperatives to establish dominant positions in the market. The regulated organization 
and conducts ensure the members’ democratic rights and their legitimate interests. 
In order to ensure a smooth establishment of the new legal system, other legislations have 
been implemented such as “Regulations on the registration of farmers' specialized 
cooperatives by the State Council and the “Regulations on the accounting systems in farmers’ 
specialized cooperatives in January 1, 2008 by Ministry of Finance (Ministry of Agriculture 
China, 2008). After the promulgation and implement of the Law, a good environment and 
development has been established among the agricultural cooperatives, which is the indicator 
of that China has entered the new stage of development following the new law.  
2) The State Council has exerted the great effort to the construction and development of 
farmer cooperatives and gradually enhanced the policy support system. The central authorities 
have deployed the new series of development on the specific requirement and also set up the 
specific policy measurements to support the finance, taxation, credit, land, electricity, 
personal, and clear policy to respond the rapid growing of farmers’ specialized cooperatives 
(ibid). 
 
3) In 1994, the Ministry of Agriculture has carried out a demonstration program for farmer 
cooperatives allowing them to improve the democratic management through this trial study as 
well as providing the guidance for implementation of standardized industrial products and 
services. The program has been first launched in Anhui and Shanxi. Furthermore, 100 
demonstration programs have been established in Zhejiang and other provinces during 2002-
2003. From 2004 to 2008, 633 farmer cooperatives have implemented for the construction of 
demonstration projects supported by the Ministry of Agriculture under the Central 
Government. These demonstration programs were carried out in province, city, and county 
levels. The strong impacts of these demostration programs as well as the local policies have 
enhanced the cooperatives’ capacity in production, technology, processing, warehouse, 
distribution and other services (ibid). 
 
4) The farmer cooperatives differentiated more from other business forms in several ways: the 
operation of standardized production and unified service has enhanced the market position of 
cooperatives. The level of farmer income has increased through the adjustment of agricultural 
structure and the potential from internal organization. In terms of industrial management, the 
introduction of “one village one product” and “one product a community” has increased the 
bargaining position of farmers. The democratic management system has been strengthened 
under “one person, one vote” decision making among members. Overall, the farmer 
cooperatives strengthened their role as the leader of rural development in China (ibid). 
 
5) Farmer cooperatives have enhanced their public recognition and reputation for past 50 
years through the corporation with the Ministry of Agricultural. Various types of Chinese 
Media continued to promote the economic strength of cooperative organizations and its strong 
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reputation. The 5th China International Agricultural Product Trade fair in 2007 was the good 
example of the collaboration of 47 Chinese specialized cooperatives with both domestic and 
foreign merchants to stimulate the market demand and social expansion (ibid).   
 
6) Concerning members’ involvement of capital in their cooperative, the national regulations 
on cooperatives in China have no rigid requirement that members must own shares or other 
forms of financial contributions. Even though such regulations have been blamed for causing 
liability limitations, they have helped a big number of farmers with weak economic conditions 
to join an agricultural cooperative. Additionally, the national regulation does not require the 
cooperatives to have a minimum amount of capital in order to be registered.  
 
Except the national regulation on agricultural cooperatives, which was implemented in 2007, 
many provinces have had different regulations on their local cooperatives. In some provinces 
that are more developed economically such as Zhejiang Province, the regulation requires that 
all members have to own shares in their cooperative and no less than 50% of the total shares 
must be owned by the members. In order to uphold the principle of democratic control in the 
cooperatives, another limitation that has been commonly used is that an individual member is 
not allowed to own more than 20% of the shares in the cooperative.  
 
In order to face the scarcity of capital in rural parts of China, non-member capital has been 
promoted as another important capital source for the development of agricultural 
cooperatives. Non-member capital refers to capital such as loans, subsidies and donations. 
Both the local governments and central government have encouraged the involvement of non-
member capital in agricultural cooperatives, not least by simplifying the cooperatives’ 
application procedures of bank loans and other financial services. Furthermore, the newly 
implemented political directives have resulted in an increasing number of village banks that 
are more specialized in providing financial support to local cooperatives. In addition to that, 
agricultural cooperatives are also benefited from preferential taxation regulations.  
 
Thanks to the lessons learned from international cooperatives and the national political 
reforms such as the implementation of the national cooperative law, agricultural cooperatives 
have transformed to one of the most successful enterprise forms in rural areas of China.  
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3. Theory  
 
3.1 Property rights theory 
 
Property rights theory was developed by Grossman and Hart (1986) and it is also referred to 
as incomplete contracting theory. Property rights theory is based on the assumption that no 
contracts can be perfectly complete because of asymmetric information which means that 
when some of the participants in a contract or transaction have certain information that is not 
accessible for other parties. According to Sykuta and Chaddad (1999:72), another argument 
for that no contracts can be perfectly complete is that individiuals' rationalities are affected by 
the limited information they have and their time limitations when making decisions. A 
property right is defined as the capacity to control or use a resource or asset and properly 
defined property rights are necessary for all kinds of cooperation (Demsetz, 1967). The core 
idea of property rights theory is that properly defined ownership could provide a solid 
foundation for the cooperative members to create, maintain and increase the assets of the 
cooperative. Cook (1995) claims that property rights are fundamental for cooperatives to 
reach sustainability and maintain a high level of member control in the organizations.  
 
Theoretically, an individual member will only be interested and permitted to control the part 
that he or she has ownership of. It means that members’ incentive and willingness to 
participate in the control of their cooperative is partly determined by the level of their 
ownership in the cooperative. However, the member owners of a cooperative wish to have the 
control over the cooperative based on the size of the share that they own in order to ensure 
that their personal interests will be prioritized in the best way. Unfortunately, although each 
member owns his or her own share of the total invested capital, the member has no right to 
control and make decisions over it (Nilsson & Björklund, 2003). Such vaguely defined 
property rights in agricultural cooperatives lead to a more complex decision-making process 
where members usually have different interests which cause conflicts and governance problems 
in cooperatives. Consequently, special expertise in handling intra-organizational conflicts is vital 
for cooperative managers in order to achieve internal stability among their members. 
 
Compared to the small cooperatives with limited ability to get loans and simple organization 
structure; this problem might be more common in big and complex cooperatives where 
significant amount of non-member capital, such as debt-capital from banks or private lender, 
is involved. Once debt capital has been injected into the capital base of the cooperative, 
members’ financial contribution, which indicates their ownership of the cooperative, will 
decrease relative to the increased total capital base. Consequently, members become less 
important financially and their incentives and also power to control the cooperative will also 
decrease which might in turn have negative impacts on member commitment. Additionally, 
when non-member capital lenders require and are given control over the cooperative, member 
control will be weakened even more. A low member participation in the governance of the 
cooperative leads to domination of managers in decision making processes in which the 
members’ interests might not be the first priority (Burt & Wirth, 1990; Hind, 1997; 1999). 
 
 
3.2 Agency Theory 
 
When an individual or organization, the so-called “agent”, acts on behalf of another who is 
called “principal”. The conflict arises when the objective of the agent is different from the 
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principle and also when the agents do not work for the interests of the principle but 
themselves (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Royer, 1999; Sykuta and Chaddad, 1999). All 
organizations in which ownership and control are separated will, more or less, have principal-
agent problems since the principal and the agent have different interests (Cook, 1995). In a 
cooperative context, the principal can be the member and their board of directors is the agent 
(ibid). When the members who are also the owners and control the cooperative have different 
goals, the problem of principle-agent is likely to happen. The agent’s responsibilities are 
normally described in the contract between the agent and the principal where it commands an 
agent to act in the principal’s interests. Since the contract cannot be perfectly defined “there 
are opportunities for shirking due to moral hazard and imperfect observability” (Royer, 
1999: 50).  
 
The major point of agency theory is on incentive and measurement problems where the risk-
sharing assumption can also not be ignored. Sykuta and Chaddad (1999:2) suggested “most 
applications of agency theory focus on the incentive vs. risk- sharing trade-off of contracts 
aimed at aligning the interests of the agent with those of the principal.” Thus, this theory is 
very concerned with institutional structure of cooperatives since the manager (employed 
manager) may not represent the best interests of the principal (cooperative owner-member). 
The challenging point is, hence, to develop the ownership and capital structure for lowering 
the agency costs (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
 
The principal-agent problems further raise member dissatisfaction. Richards et al. (1998:32) 
argued that cooperatives have more experience of agency problems than investor own firms 
(IOFs) because of the lack of “capital market discipline, a clear profit motive, and the 
transitive nature of ownership.” Since there is no market for cooperative equity, the 
monitoring from members of their mangers is likely to be less as opposed to investor own 
firms. Another difficulty for cooperatives is whether to design the incentive schemes to match 
with personal objectives of managers with those of cooperatives. Richards et al. (1998), using 
the data from a survey of cooperative members in Alberta, Canada, found out that managers 
mainly focus on the social role of cooperatives neither emphasizing the profit issue such as 
higher prices, return on equity, nor quality of service. These members seemed to be 
dissatisfied with their cooperative managers’ performance. 
 
According to the agency theory, there are several problems that are likely to arise when the 
ownership is separated from the governance of the business. One of the problems is called the 
free-rider problem, which refers to those situations when a person enjoys the benefits 
generated by common resources without making proportional contributions in order to create 
and maintain such resources. Since all the assets in cooperatives are collectively owned, every 
member has access to all the assets built up collectively. On the other hand, the members who 
quit the cooperative are not allowed to take those assets in the cooperative that these members 
have created. Such characteristics of cooperatives many times encourage the members to act 
as a free rider simply because members want to get as much benefits as possible from the 
cooperative while minimizing the level of their personal contributions.  
 
In addition to that, the members of a cooperative and its management have in many cases 
different, sometimes contradictory, demands on the business. Such differences will cause the 
so-called horizon problem, which consists of pressure from the members in order to increase 
the current patronage refund rather than to make expensive investments for more long-term 
benefits. Horizon problems are difficult to avoid, especially for large cooperatives, because 
the individual members’ planning horizon is dependent on a complicated combination of 
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factors such as their age, experience, values, etc. On the other hand, management teams in 
cooperatives plan their strategies and decisions based on the time that they will be elected and 
employed. As long as the members and the managers have different time perspectives, the 
development of the cooperative will be inhibited since not all members’ interests can be 
optimized. 
 
 
3.3 Social capital theory 
 
Like other types of capital, social capital is productive and makes it possible to achieve goals 
that would not be possible in its absence (Coleman 1990). Social capital consists of social 
networks and norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness (Putman, 2000). Social capital is 
important in all kinds of inter-personal and inter-organizational relationships because its 
ability to reduce the risks that the actors in a relationship would behave deceitfully.  
 
The existence of social capital in a relationship can be indicated by the level of trust. Both in 
social life and business contexts, the more trust the partners have on each other, the easier it is 
to cooperate without having high transaction costs. There are different kinds of transaction 
costs. For example, the costs for reaching appropriate agreements between the parties 
involved and also the cost of monitoring another party in order to make sure that it acts 
according to the agreed contract (Malone, Yates, and Benjamin, 1987). In other words, an 
investment of financial capital might not lead to expected results if social capital is not strong 
enough (Nilsson, Svendsen & Svendsen, 2012). In addition to the ability to reduce 
transactional costs, social capital generates high decision flexibility, which in turn improves 
productivity and growth (Gabre-Madhin, 2001). According to Gilson (2003), the 
organizations with relatively high social capital are usually more efficient than those with low 
social capital.  
 
“The cooperative spirit is widely accepted as the main force of the cooperative.” (Dnes and 
Foxall, 1981). This can be interpreted as cooperative’s social capital. Social capital may be 
regarded as another crucial production factor in agricultural cooperatives in addition to 
traditional ones such as human and physical capital (Coleman, 1988). The term “social 
capital” has been defined differently depending on the context in which the term is used. 
Considering that this study is focused on agricultural cooperatives, social capital is in this 
study defined as a set of resources such as values, norms, trust and loyalty that are 
accumulated over time in the cooperative through social relationships, which facilitates the 
completion of goals (Leenders and Gabbay, 1999).  
 
Valentinov (2003) claims that agricultural cooperatives are much more dependent on social 
capital compared to other types of organizations. Agricultural cooperatives are designed as a 
network that connects and gathers farmers to better coordinate resources and achieve common 
goals. These farmer members are voluntarily gathered instead of running their own farms 
individually. Therefore, social capital will always be one of the keys to connect and maintain 
these individual farmers as a united entity working for common goals. Even though managers 
in an agricultural cooperative might achieve favorable short-term results by making their own 
decisions, the success is difficult to be maintained in the long run without the members 
participating in the cooperative system. An active member participation in the cooperative 
operation provides better opportunities for the management to build up close relationships, 
including loyalty and trust, with farmer members which in turn results in higher social capital. 
 
 15 
Social capital can be important for agricultural cooperatives in different aspects. A high level 
of social capital in an agricultural cooperative means that the members are more likely to 
comply with agreements and trust each other, which in turn contributes to reduced 
transactional costs. A lack of trust between managers and members leaves the members no 
choices other than spending valuable resources on formal agreement and monitoring whether 
the managers are acting according to the contract. As an owner and investor of the 
cooperative, each individual member’s commitment to the cooperative is based on the 
expectation and belief that he or she can benefit from the collective actions.  
 
Unfortunately, it is not always easy for the cooperative members to feel completely confident 
about that their interests will be prioritized since most decisions will be made by a small 
number of managers. In order for the cooperatives to minimize such possible agency 
problems caused by information asymmetry, social capital in the form of trust, especially 
between farmer members and the managers or board, will be significantly important. Only 
after the trust has been built up among members, their commitment will be stimulated and 
maintained in the agricultural cooperatives. Without such trust and confidence in the 
management, the managers’ decisions are less likely to be supported and member 
commitment could be negatively affected.  
 
The level of social capital in a cooperative could also be indicated by the level to which 
farmer members are willing to contribute capital in different forms to the cooperative (Sexton 
and Iskow, 1988). Additionally, a good relationship and trust between members are the social 
capital that is highly necessary in order to avoid conflicts between members; since they all 
expect to benefit by the same collective actions as each of them may have different interests at 
the same time. When agricultural cooperatives operate to achieve long-term goals, social 
capital in the form of loyalty makes sure that the members remain supportive and committed 
when the cooperative facing temporary losses even without explicit contracts.  
 
As has been mentioned before, the free-rider problem weakens the members’ incentives to 
invest in their agricultural cooperatives. According to Paldam and Svendsen (2000), such 
free-riding problems could be reduced by building up strong social capital, which requires 
close communications and active participations between members and managers.  
 
 
3.4 Theoretical conclusion 
 
Based on the theoretical discussion above, following figures are constructed to illustrate the 
key elements of the theories and the theoretical conclusion. Each figure is followed by a 
description that explains the figure. 
 
Property rights theory 
 
                                          
  Non-member Debt capital                                         
                     
  Asymmetric information    , Members’ ownership                                                               
                                                                         
  Member control        
 
Figure 1: Illustration of theoretical conclusion based on Property rights theory 
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Based on the property rights theory, we assume that an increased level of non-member debt 
capital in agricultural cooperatives might lead to weakened member control considering 
increased asymmetric information and decreased member-ownership. 
 
 
Agency theory  
 
 
  Non-member Debt capital     
 
 
  External interests and impacts          
 
  Member control             
 
 
  Priority of members’ interests         
 
Figure 2: Illustration of theoretical based on Agency theory 
When non-member debt capital increases, external lenders take over a bigger control of the 
cooperative and members have less control over their cooperative. It means that external 
interests will have bigger impacts on the cooperative and members’ interest becomes a lower 
priority.  
 
 
Social capital theory 
 
 
  Non-member Debt capital               
 
 
  Member control and interests                
 
 
  Members’ participation in the governance           
 
  Communication between members and managers     
 
 
            Social capital           
          
  Members’ willingness to invest       
   
 
  Member commitment      
 
Figure 3: Illustration of theoretical conclusion based on Social capital theory 
Once member control and priority of members’ interests become negatively affected as the 
first two figures illustrated, level of social capital is likely to be weakened considering 
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decreased member participation and communication between members and managers. As a 
consequence of that, members’ commitment to their cooperative will be undermined.   
 
 
3.5 Hypotheses 
 
In accordance with the theoretical discussion and conclusion above, debt capital’s effects on 
member commitment in agricultural cooperatives will be measured by five indicators 
including members’ willingness to invest, level of member control, superiority of members’ 
interests, members’ benefits from their cooperative, level of social capital. 
 
The following hypotheses are constructed based on the theoretical discussion and conclusion 
above: 
 
Hypothesis 1 
 
The more non-member debt capital an agricultural cooperative has, the less financial 
contributions the members will make to the cooperative.  
 
As debt capital accounts for a bigger part of the total capital basis, the farmer members will 
perceive that their role as financiers has become weakened and less important for the 
cooperative. The member might prefer to enjoy benefits generated by borrowed money 
instead of taking more risks by investing their own money. Debt capital means in many cases 
higher risks for the agricultural cooperatives and these cooperatives are often said to be risk-
averse (Hendrikse, 1998). In such situations, the members will be even more frightened of 
investing more money if they think that the repayment risks and other terms attached to the 
loans might lead to an increased uncertainty to the cooperative’s long term success, especially 
for those members who joined the cooperative to reduce the risks of his or her overall 
agricultural operation. Whether the members think that the debt capital will be used to finance 
risky projects and strategies such as market integrations (Nilsson 2012) also influence the 
level of members’ concern caused by the debt capital. Additionally, an increased level of 
influences from non-member lenders might also lead to weakened incentives for the members 
to invest as a result of the members being more uncertain that their interests will be the main 
priorities of the cooperative.  
 
 
Hypothesis 2 
The more debt capital an agricultural cooperative has, the more benefits members will get 
from their cooperative. 
An increased level of financial capital gives managers extra financial strength so more 
investment opportunities could be considered. As the cooperative grows, the members might 
be more satisfied considering the benefits generated by a bigger scale of business, improved 
services and increased incomes. Such an increased level of satisfaction has positive impact on 
the social capital in the cooperative. 
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Hypothesis 3 
 
The more non-member debt capital an agricultural cooperative has, the lower is the level of 
member control (participation) in the cooperative.  
 
In order to provide desirable services and improve the members’ wealth, it is very important 
that the members actively take part in the governance of the cooperatives (Bhuyan, 2007; 
Gray & Kraenzle, 1998). As the financial capital grows bigger, the management tends to 
make the control over the cooperative even more centralized to the CEO and managers. 
Consequently, the members will have more difficulties to present their interests in the 
governance of the cooperative. In addition, property rights theory says that a member is only 
interested to care about the part that he owns. Once each member’s investment in the 
cooperative accounts for a smaller part of the total capital basis, the members’ will have less 
motivations to spend time and resources to practice member control by actively seeking 
information, electing qualified directors and attending meetings. Thus, the more debt being 
involved the lower is the level of member control in the cooperative.  
 
 
Hypothesis 4 
 
The more non-member debt capital an agricultural cooperative has, the less the cooperative 
will be perceived as working for the interests of the members  
 
As a consequence of the influences from debt capital providers and members’ weakened 
incentives, an increased non-member debt capital undermines the members’ control of the 
cooperative. Without being able to influence the decisions, the members lose their incentives 
and motivations to actively share and participate in the governance of the cooperative. In turn, 
the power to make decisions will be increasingly concentrated on the non-member financiers 
and management in which the members’ interests might not always be prioritized or 
understood in the first place.  
 
Additionally, the management of the cooperative might need to reconsider and adjust the 
operation and strategy of the cooperative in order to make repayments and follow other loan 
covenants. Such concerns and changes might be, at least interpreted by the members, 
restricting the managerial flexibility and sacrificing the interests of the members. Also, a 
stronger capital basis might also arouse the management’s ambition to expand the business 
instead of offering the members better payments and services.  
 
According to Staatz (1987) and Hendrikse (1998), most of the members invest in agricultural 
cooperatives to reduce the risks in their farming activities. Considering the risks embedded in 
the cooperatives’ acquisition of debt capital and fast expansion, the members who involve in 
the cooperative to reduce the risks would not be committed to the management’s decisions. 
These risk-averse members will think that the goals that the management works for are totally 
contradictory to their own interests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 19 
Hypothesis 5 
 
The more non-member debt capital an agricultural cooperative has, the less social capital 
this cooperative will have 
 
The amount of social capital is dependent on the level of trust, member participation, 
relationships and other social factors. As it has been mentioned before, an increased portion of 
debt capital might have, in different aspects, negative effects on the involvement of members 
in the governance. A lack of such member participation and involvement blocks one of the 
most important communication channels that should be used to exchange opinion and 
information in order to achieve higher social capital in the form of understanding and trust 
between the members and the managers. Except that, the trust between the managers and the 
members might also be suffering considering the increased risk that other interests will be 
prioritized over the members’ interests. For those members who joined the cooperative in 
order to reduce the risks of their overall farming activities, their trust and commitment to the 
management would be seriously damaged if they perceive the acquisition of debt capital as 
unacceptably risky. 
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4. Methodological issues  
 
4.1 Choice of method  
 
In order to test the hypotheses in the previous chapter, the empirical data used in this study 
was collected via phone interview method in April 2012. The interviews were carried out with 
seven cooperatives from Zhejiang province, China.  
 
The choice of method that we could use in this study such as Internet survey and online 
questionaire was limited by a low usage of Internet and other computer based communication 
tools among the managers and farmers in rural areas of China. Due to the time and budget 
limitation, the phone interview method was used to collect qualitative data. We believed that a 
qualitative method, which means more explicit explanations and examples, would help us to 
better understand the topic that our study is focused on. Although the phone interview does 
not provide the same quality of empirical data as the face-to-face interviews, the authors do 
believe that the data collected via this method was important to this study. 
 
4.2 Selection of interviewees 
 
Initially, our supervisor, Jerker Nilsson, introduced us to a Chinese Professor from Zhejiang 
Province, China. Later, we were in touch with him via email. A Chinese professor futher 
introduced us different types of external capital that are commonly used by Chinese 
cooperatives and kindly provided us the list of 18 Chinese agricultural cooperatives from 
Zhejiang, China. The list consisted of names of the cooperatives, contact persons, and their 
phone numbers. These cooperatives were contacted via phone (Skype) and asked for an 
interview with one of their managers and a member representative.  
 
After contacting all 18 cooperatives, managers from seven cooperatives were willing to be our 
interviewees but none of them provided us possibility to interview a member representative 
from their cooperatives. Seven other cooperatives rejected our interview, neither with the 
managers nor with the members. Unfortunately, we were not able to contact with four 
cooperatives because of invalid contact information. The reasons that the managers gave us 
for why interviews with members were denied were that the absolute majority of the 
managers in the cooperatives are also members of it. In addition, most of these managers are 
engaged in highly identical farming activities as members without managerial duties. The 
managers from all seven cooperatives were confident that they had deep insights and 
understandings about their members’ standing points and therefore able to represent their 
members in our interviews. However, we suspected that the lack of information from non-
manager members might make our results less reliable and representative and because of that, 
we made several changes and reformulated some of the interview questions. These changes 
mean that the managers were not only asked for answering our questions based on their own 
views but also what they think the members’ opinions are. By doing so, we hope that we can, 
to a certain extent, compensate the lack of information from non-manager members. 
 
4.3 The interviews 
 
Each of our five hypotheses, as presented in chapter 3, is tested by a set of open-ended 
questions. Some of these open-ended questions are expected to provide answers that can be 
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used in the analysis of more than just one hypothesis. Without changing the purpose of the 
questions, these 5 sets of questions were mixed and asked in an order that we thought would 
be least inconvenient for the interviewees to give more explicit answers. Despite this, we 
would not be surprised if some of the managers chose to avoid sharing the information that 
would negatively affect the reputation of their cooperative. All the phone interviews were 
made in Chinese Mandarin and were implemented with a question guide containing short 
questions about the background of the cooperative and more open-ended questions 
concerning debt capital and member commitment. The original question guide for the 
interviews is found in the fifth chapter and the appendix. 
 
Each interview lasted for about 30 minutes. In the beginning of the call, interviewees were 
informed about the aim of the thesis as well as an introduction about ourselves. In addition, 
each interviewee was asked for permission for recording their responses. Out of seven 
cooperatives that were willing to participate in our study, five did not mind that their names 
would be mentioned in the paper. So, five agricultural cooperatives will be referred to by 
using their names and two other one as cooperative A and B. All seven cooperatives are listed 
in Table 1. Two mobile phones have been used as voice recorder. Most of the calls have been 
made during office hour 15.00-16.00 on weekdays (+7 GST time) in China. After all the 
interviews, the recorded answers were translated by the same author into English and further 
used for discussion and analysis in the following chapters.  
 
Table 1: Names of interviewees, positions and name of their cooperatives 
 
Qi Long Li Manager Fu Yang Hu Yuan Chicken Cooperative 
Xue Sheng Wang CEO Hang Zhou Ban Shan Fruit Cooperative  
Gen Fa Wang Manager Jian De San Du Saffron Cooperative 
Chong Gen Zhang CEO Tong Xiang Dong Jia vegetable Cooperative 
Liu Sheng Yan CEO Jia Xing Wan Hao vegetable Cooperative 
Manager A Manager Fruit and vegetable Cooperative  
Manager B CEO Vegetable Cooperative  
 
 
4.4 Summary  
 
In this study, we used a qualitative approach in the collection of empirical data. We made 
phone interviews with seven agricultural cooperatives from Zhejiang province in China. 
During the interviews, we used a question guide containing short background questions and 
open-ended questions. The interviews were made with chief executive officers and, in three 
cases, other top managers in the cooperatives.  
 
All the interviews were made in Chinese Mandrine and each interview lasted for about 30 
minutes. Two of our seven intervees required to be anonymous when presenting their answers 
in this thesis.  
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5. Empirical findings and analysis 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter includes a presentation and analysis of the empirical findings from the interviews 
as described in Chapter 4. The presentation and analysis follow the same structure and order 
as the five hypotheses listed in Chapter 3. Firstly, each of the hypotheses will be once again 
declared and briefly explained followed by a presentation of the interview questions that were 
used to test the hypothesis. After that, the answers from the different cooperative managers, 
which are relevant to connect to the hypothesis, will be presented and analyzed. In the end of 
each section that concerns one hypothesis, whether the hypothesis was supported by the 
empirical data or not will be discussed. Bases on the analysis of the interview answers, a 
summary of the results from the five hypotheses will be presented in table 2 in the end of this 
chaper. 
 
 
5.2 Hypothesis 1 
 
The more non-member debt capital an agricultural cooperative has, the less financial 
contributions the members will make to the cooperative.  
 
This hypothesis concerns the relationship between members’ willingness to invest capital in 
the cooperative and the cooperative’s acquisition of debt capital. It was assumed that the 
members would be less willing to invest in the cooperative once the cooperative starts using 
debt capital. The interview questions that are asked to test this hypothesis are:  
 
1. What are the incentives for the farmers to join your cooperative? 
2. Are there any members being concerned about that the cooperative might have 
difficulties to make repayments and fulfill other terms of the loans?   
3. Do the lenders’ influence on the cooperative business affect the members’ willingness 
to make financial contributions to the cooperative? 
4. How do you think the cooperative’s dependence on the members’ investments has 
changed after acquiring debt capital?  
5. How often have the members made investments in the cooperative compared to the 
time without debt capital? 
 
Most interviewees claimed that their cooperative became much less dependent on the capital 
provided by the farmer members after the acquisition of debt capital. The loans are much 
larger than the member capital in the form of member shares and member fees. Two 
interviewees even said that their cooperatives’ businesses would not be affected if some 
members want to quit the cooperative and withdraw their shares from the cooperative. Only 
one of the cooperative’s representative that were interviewed still raises funds from their 
members regularly and there have not been significant changes concerning members’ 
attitudes towards investing in the cooperatives. One comment that was frequently mentioned 
by the interviewees was that the loans became easier and easier to get once the relationship 
with the lender was established.  
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“From the members’ perspective, the acquisition of debt capital made us released from the 
pressure that we have to collect enough capital all by ourselves. Most of our members have 
very limited resources and some of them can barely afford fertilizers and pesticides during the 
peak seasons. (Qi, 2012)” 
 
“Before investing, the members must know that their investments will be taken good care of 
and can generate profits for them in the form of a yearly bonus. Also the members have to see 
that the cooperative is developing in the right direction. Debt capital was the key for us to 
achieve that. (Xue, 2012)” 
 
“The biggest reason that many of our farmers invest in our cooperative is that they will get an 
attractive amount of year-end bonus based on the shares they have in the cooperative. 
(Chong, 2012)” 
 
All the cooperatives that we interviewed claimed that the member investment was very low 
already before the involvement of debt capital, which explains why the cooperatives needed 
loans in the first place. As one of the interviewees said “the capital collected from the 
members is far from enough to buy all our members’ products.” (Manager B, 20120). The 
majority of the members in his cooperative has made very limited financial contributions to 
the cooperative simply because their economies do not allow them to. Four of our 
interviewees commented that the government during recent years has made it relatively easier 
for the cooperatives to acquire debt capital as a part of the effort to encourage and support the 
agricultural cooperatives to intensify their role as engines that lead the farmers to a wealthier 
life.  
 
“Except a very small amount in the form of member fee that every member must pay when 
they join the cooperative, only about 30% of our 1600 members have made additional 
investments in the form of shares of the cooperative. Sometimes, members had to borrow 
money to be able to invest in the cooperative. As a manager of the cooperative, we always 
keep in mind our role and try to benefit as many farmers as possible in a concrete way, 
including those members without the opportunity to contribute to the cooperative 
financially.” (Liu, 2012) 
 
Three interviewees claimed that the influences from the lenders have caused some 
inconveniences among their members. Two of these cooperatives borrow money from private 
lenders who are relatively rich and well established in their respective villages. Even though 
compromises are sometimes necessary, the members of these cooperatives seem to understand 
the importance of the borrowed money. The influences from the lenders were not considered 
as a big problem that harms the members’ commitment to the cooperative given that the 
members have enough trust on the managers and the borrowed money enable the members to 
make more profits. Other cooperatives claimed that the lenders’ involvement has not caused 
any unwished reactions among the members. Despite the existence of different opinions from 
the members and lenders, the managers in these cooperatives have been trusted by both 
groups and succeeded to make decisions that are best for the members.  
 
“It is true that our members sometimes do not have the same opinions as the lenders. But it is 
also true that the members now can make more profits from their vegetables and other 
benefits generated by the borrowed money. Anyway, I have heard stories about disputes 
between members and managers mostly as a result of the members’ suspecting and being 
uncertain about the lenders intensions. What I think is that a close and trustworthy 
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relationship with our members and lenders is enough to minimize dissatisfaction caused by 
disagreements between the members and the lenders.” (Chong, 2012) 
 
Three of our interviewees told us that they have never had problems with the amortization of 
the loans. Such good performances from managers was mentioned frequently as another 
important factor that creates and maintains the level of members’ trust in the management, 
despite the possible risks and uncertainties attached to different decisions such as taking 
loans. In other words, the increased risks caused by the usage of debt capital would not affect 
the members’ engagement in the cooperative business as long as the risks can be outweighed 
by the members’ hope for higher economic returns and their trust on the managers.  
 
 “Of course we have to consider the lenders’ opinions when making decisions. These 
financiers have very close relationship with the cooperative and sometimes they do not even 
require interests for the loans. We all appreciate their help and we can understand that they 
can have their opinions in order to make sure that we can pay back the money.” (Qi, 2012) 
 
“Even before the acquisition of debt capital, we had a hard time to make all our members 
happy simply because they did not always have completely the same view on every decision. 
What has been very important is that not only the managers but also the board members are 
very competent and, more importantly, respected among local farmers.” (Gen, 2012) 
 
“Our cooperative has never had problems with paying back the money since we started 
borrowing so we no longer think there are big risks with the existing level of debt capital.” 
(Xue, 2012) 
 
“I think there will always be some members feeling less satisfied than others no matter 
external lenders are involved or not, but as long as the members have enough trust in the 
managers, the members’ engagement in our cooperative would not be undermined.” 
(Manager A, 2012) 
 
We could find details from almost all the seven interviews that partly support our first 
hypothesis concerning debt capital and the members’ willingness to invest in the cooperative. 
In accordance with the agency theory, we found indications that the external lenders’ 
influences on the cooperative resulted in more severe principal-agent problems which means 
that the members had decreased power to monitor and influence the cooperative. Different 
from what has been discussed in the agency theory, such increased principal-agent problems 
have not been specifically mentioned by the interviewees as the main cause of the 
significantly decreased member investments in their cooperatives. All the interviewees 
mentioned that their members have very limited resources to contribute member capital to the 
cooperative. The answers indicated that there is a common understanding of the members’ 
tough economic situations and therefore an acceptance of the members’ free-rider behaviors 
among the cooperative managers. These cooperatives try to live up to the expectation from 
the society and the government as a tool to enable the members to have higher incomes, 
including those with no money to make investments in the cooperatives which, according to 
the agency theory, could be considered as free riders. 
 
In line with the social capital theory, it seems like social capital in the form of trust and 
personal relationship between the managers and members has an important role. The 
members’ hope for higher incomes and their trust in the managers eliminate their fear that the 
lenders’ influences would harm the interests of the members. According to the social capital 
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theory, a suspiction among the members that their interests are being suffered will weaken 
productivity in the cooperative.  
Additionally, five of seven interviewees agreed that debt capital have led to higher risks for 
their cooperative. However, the interview answers did not show that the members became 
more uncertain to cooperate with their cooperstive because of the increased risks. The reason 
to this could be found in the social capital theory which says that a high level of trust between 
the members and the managers makes it easier for the members to be committed to more risky 
decision. 
 
 
5.3 Hypothesis 2 
The more debt capital an agricultural cooperative has the more benefits members will get 
from their cooperative. 
Hypothesis 2 concerns the relationship between debt capital in agricultural cooperatives and 
its ability to generate more benefits to its member. It was assumed that the usage of debt 
capital in agricultural cooperatives will lead to improved performance and therefore increased 
benefits to their members. The interview questions that are asked to test this hypothesis are:  
 
1. How has the acquisition of debt capital contributed to the financial performance and 
results of the cooperative?   
2. How has the members been benefited by the acquisition of debt capital so far? Give 
examples. 
 
As we expected before the interviews, the responses from all seven cooperative managers 
indicate that the debt capital has given the cooperatives much stronger capital basis, which 
open up for new business opportunities. According to our interviewees, the loans used to be 
mainly spent in areas such as marketing, factory buildings, and purchase of members’ 
products and members support.  
 
Many of the interviewees emphasized the importance of investments in marketing. Some of 
them also shared the understanding and awareness that their increased expenses in the 
marketing will in many cases have indirect and relatively slow effects on the members’ 
incomes. Even though it has been mentioned that some members used to have a less 
optimistic view on the actual effects of such types of long-term investments, the majority of 
the members share the view that the investments in different marketing tools and activities are 
necessary for a sustainable growth of their cooperatives.  
 
In most cases, the acquisitions of debt capital in these seven agricultural cooperatives have 
generated more direct and concrete benefits to the members. By using debt capital, the 
cooperatives have been able to pay higher prices to their members. Four of the interviewees 
mentioned that they always try to buy their members’ products for higher prices than what 
other buyer would offer them. In other words, the members can increase their income simply 
by selling their products to their cooperative rather than other buyers. Even though the 
acquisition of debt capital cannot give any guarantees that the cooperatives will always have a 
positive result at the end of the year, the members can still be benefited considering their 
cooperatives’ stable purchases and high payments for the members’ products. Such 
advantages will be extra clear and important for the members when the demand and prices in 
the market become unstable. 
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In addition, as the number of members grows fast in many cooperatives and considering that 
these members normally have very limited capital to invest in the cooperative, the 
cooperatives have to find capital from other sources to be able to pay for the increased trading 
volume from the members. Without acquiring additional capital, the cooperative would offer 
the members a lower price for their products or restrict the number of members, which would 
cause dissatisfaction among the members. One of the managers also said that a part of their 
debt capital has been used as microloans to the members who cannot afford farming inputs. 
 
“For instance, the price that the cooperative pays for the members’ peaches has increased 
from 0.8 Yuan to more than 2 Yuan in a short period of time.” (Xue, 2012) 
 
“The members know that the cooperative always offer them higher prices than if they sell in 
the local market.” (Liu, 2012) 
 
“Except that we offer a price that our members are satisfied with, we have plans to take out a 
bigger part from the profits to return to our members based on their trade with the 
cooperative.” (Qi, 2012) 
 
“Based on my experiences, what our members are attracted to is firstly, a reasonable and 
relatively stable price for their products and a high repatriation of profits in the end of the 
year. As you can see all of these require more capital for the cooperative. I know many 
cooperatives being forced to restrict the number of their members because these cooperatives 
would not be able to afford the costs of a significantly increased trading volume from the new 
members.” (Managr B, 2012) 
 
“Thanks to the loans from the local cooperative bank, we could build our own cold 
storehouse. For a cooperative like us, selling fruits or vegetables, having our own cold 
storehouse is very important.” (Manager A, 2012) 
 
We can claim that our second hypothesis has been supported by the answers from the 
interviewees. Debt capital in these seven cooperatives has had important effects on the 
members’ increasing incomes and it allows the cooperatives to benefit farmers even more. 
The debt capital has also helped the cooperatives to improve their long-term competitiveness. 
An increasing income has been mentioned many times by our interviewees as the best 
possible achievement that would make the members satisfied with the cooperative. Such 
satisfaction generated by the debt capital made the members more loyal to their cooperative 
which, according to the social capital theory, significantly strengthens the members’ 
commitment to their cooperative. In turn, the concrete profits to the members also minimize 
the principal-agent problem which is, according to the agency theory, common among 
cooperatives. 
 
Additionally, an increased social capital in form of members’ loyalty to the cooperative is 
essential for the management to optimize the benefits from the debt capital (Nilsson, 
Svendsen & Svendsen, 2012).  
 
 
 
 
 
 27 
5.4 Hypothesis 3 
 
The more non-member debt capital an agricultural cooperative has the lower is the level of 
member control participation in the cooperative.  
 
Hypothesis 3 concerns how the level of member control would be affected by involvement of 
debt capital in agricultural cooperatives. Our assumption was that the involvement of debt 
capital in agricultural cooperatives would lead to decreased level of member control. The 
interview questions that are asked to test this hypothesis are:  
 
1. How engaged are the members when it comes to seeking information, attending 
meetings and express their opinions? Compare to before debt, why?   
2. How much can the members influence the decisions now, compared to when no debt 
capital was involved?   
3. What are the members’ views of the risks that are attached with the debt capital of 
your cooperative?   
4. Do the lenders give their opinions and advices about the operation of the cooperative? 
How does the management handle them?  
5. Except the possible influence from the lenders, are there any changes in the operation 
or strategy in order to adapt to the terms attached to it (e.g. repayment and interests)?  
6. Do the members have opinions about how to use the borrowed money?   
 
Even though the interviewees have not directly pointed out any big changes on the level of 
member control after the acquisition of debt capital, there were many comments that we 
found interesting.  
 
Six of our seven interviewees claimed that the lenders used to have suggestions and opinions 
about the cooperatives’ operation and strategies. Normally, the lenders do not have the formal 
right to involve in the governance of the cooperative but it is still very common that the 
lenders become involved in one or another way. The level of the lenders’ involvement seems 
to be higher in those cooperatives with private lenders and most of the interviewees in these 
cooperatives had a positive attitude about it.  
 
Except one interviewee who refused to follow the lenders’ advice, all other interviewees 
claimed that they have been willing to think over and discuss about the lenders’ suggestions. 
They did not have anything against following the lenders’ advice as long as the suggestion 
can be beneficial to the members and supported by the member representatives in the board. 
One of the interviewees further explained that even though the private lenders might not 
always be experts in what the cooperative is doing, they are still relatively successful actors in 
the village. In other words, many of the lenders’ advices have been very innovative and 
constructive, especially when it comes to marketing, accounting, sales or other areas in which 
the agricultural cooperatives in China usually have limited knowledge and experiences. 
 
“Of course we have to consider the lenders’ opinions when making decisions. These 
financiers have very close relationship with the cooperative and sometimes they do not even 
require interests for the loans. We all appreciate their help and we can understand that they 
can have their opinions in order to make sure that we can pay back the money.” (Gen, 2012) 
 
“These lenders are all rich and very well-established people in our local society. From a 
manager’s perspective, it is of course important to keep a good relationship with these rich 
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and influential people, at least for the interests of the cooperative. But of course, the 
managers would not do anything that is harmful for our members. We and many of our close 
relatives are also members of the cooperative.” (Chong, 2012) 
 
Considering the fact that almost all of our interviewees have shown a clear understanding and 
acceptance of lenders’ right to give comments and advice to the cooperatives, these are 
reasons to believe that the lenders’ influence in the governance of the cooperatives might be 
taking over a part of the controlling power from the members. The size of such redistribution 
of controlling power is dependent on how much the lenders try to involve themselves in the 
affairs of the cooperative and also how the managers handle the lenders’ attempts to become 
involve. However, whether such influences from the lenders would harm the members’ 
interests will be discussed in the section dealing with the fourth hypothesis. 
 
In addition to the private lenders, four of the cooperatives we interviewed acquired debt 
capital from local financial institutions such as cooperative banks or commercial banks. In 
recent years, these financial institutions have become very important tools used by the 
government to encourage and supervise the development of agricultural cooperatives in 
China. A big series of reforms in the cooperative banks and commercial banks have to 
different degree facilitated and regularized capitalization in Chinese agricultural cooperatives.  
 
Instead of actively influencing the cooperatives’ decisions as we discussed about the private 
lenders, the financial institutions are involved more as regulators who have formal rights to 
monitor the cooperatives’ operations and economic situations. For the cooperatives who have 
borrowed money from these banks, such monitoring means that the managers of the 
cooperatives have to regularly submit their account records and other reports to the banks 
about their economic status, governance structure and other important issues. An inability to 
provide such information and fulfill the requirements would lead to rejection from the banks 
or suspended payments of the loan until the failures have been corrected. One such area that 
the banks use to keep an eye on is the cooperative’s routines of democratic member control. 
All the interviewees whose cooperatives have borrowed money from local financial 
institutions mentioned the lenders’ formal requirements that a democratic member control 
needs to be practiced and it has to be reported regularly. 
 
“Our capital basis had a dramatic increase after receiving loans from the bank. We faced 
pressures from both the lender (cooperative bank) and the board that the cooperative had to 
adopt more clear and regularized routines of democratic control in order to make it easier for 
the members to participate in different decision making processes.” (Qi, 2012) 
 
“After acquiring debt capital from the banks, what we have seen is that more members 
became more curious and interested in the governance of the cooperative. Except the 
supervision by the bank, also the farmer members started suggesting more organized 
governance routines and practices.” (Liu, 2012) 
 
“We need to submit notes and accounting book every quarter to show how we have used the 
money.” (Manager B, 2012) 
 
However, even though we could not find anything that indicates the financial institutions’ 
direct participation in the governance of the cooperatives or direct influences on their decision 
making, many interviewees emphasized that the banks had power to reject the cooperatives’ 
loan application if they did not like the cooperatives’ plan about how to use the loans.  
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“In our case, the credit cooperative has large power to influence how the cooperative uses 
the borrowed money. We needed to describe our plan in detail in our application for loan 
how we want to spend the money and it happens sometime that we adjust our plans to make 
sure that our application will be approved.” (Manager B, 2012) 
 
For some of the cooperatives that we interviewed, it seems like acquisition of more capital 
have had a positive effect on members’ willingness to participate in the governance of their 
cooperative.  
 
“As the size of our cooperative grew, my personal view is that the members have become 
more curious about the cooperative.” (Xue, 2012) 
 
All of our interviewees claimed that debt capital gave them more hope about the future and 
they were all expecting a faster expansion of the cooperatives’ business. The details from 
their comments about their future ambitions and expansions revealed another very interesting 
consequence that debt capital can cause on level of member participation in agricultural 
cooperative: As the cooperatives’ capital basis grows larger, the managers have now 
possibilities to further develop and expand the cooperative. Such expansion and growth 
means that the cooperative have to start making more complicated decisions in those business 
areas that the managers, even less for the farmer members, have never been involved in 
before. It might be increased needs of marketing activities, extended cooperation with 
supermarket chains, vertical or horizontal integrations and so on. Considering the high 
complexity that use to be connected with these issues and the Chinese farmers’ low 
educational level, it is very likely that the farmer members will experience an inability to 
understand the problems, even less the solutions, and therefore not being able to influence the 
decision making processes as much as he or she did in the past when problems and decisions 
were much easier to grasp. 
 
“In the very beginning stage of our cooperative business, we had less members and a small 
capital basis. At that time, the decisions were of very simple nature and all the business were 
done locally without being involved in any unfamiliar issues.” (Qi, 2012) 
 
“Before our business became serious, we didn’t have to work with more complex issues such 
as marketing, branding, distribution management or market integrations simply because we 
did not see any need of that and would not be able to afford it either.” (Gen, 2012) 
  
“Our capital basis now is so much stronger than before we started acquiring loans from 
others and this allows us to expand the business which means that more and more of those 
more complex issues have become absolutely necessary and affordable for us.” (Manager A, 
2012) 
 
Regardless of whether the debt capital came from private lenders or institutional lenders, debt 
capital caused increased influences from the debt providers and more asymmetric information 
which decreased the members’ control of their cooperative. Debt capital also led to a more 
complex capital structure and therefore a more vaguely defined ownership of the cooperative 
which, according to the property rights theory, would also decrease the level of member 
control. Additionally, the level of member capital which indicates the members’ ownership of 
the cooperative decreased significantly in relation to the strenthened capital base. According 
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to the property right theory, such a perception of a shrinked ownership weakens the members’ 
incentives to control their cooperative.  
 
Compared to the private lenders, the acquisitions of debt capital from institutional lenders 
such as cooperative banks or commercial banks had less negative impacts on the members’ 
control of their cooperative. Except the banks’ role as regulators who can monitor the 
cooperatives’ major activities, level of member control in cooperatives might also be 
weakened considering financial institutions’ right to disapprove cooperatives’ original plans 
of how to use the loans. Considering the Chinese farmers’ low managerial skills, member 
control also decreased when managers spent the borrowed money on quick expansions 
involving much more complex problems and decisions. However, this type of negative impact 
on member control has a more direct relation with cooperatives’ quick expansions and 
increasingly complicated business activities rather than debt capital itself.  
 
In addition to the negative effects, it can be expected that acquisition of debt capital from 
financial institutions will also have certain positive impacts on the level of member control. 
The reason is that all agricultural cooperatives that want to take loans have to accept and 
follow the financial institutions’ supervision and requirements for how democratic 
governance should work in agricultural cooperatives. On the other hand, the actual size and 
results of such positive influences should not be exaggerated or excessively generalized 
considering such formal regulations from the banks, as many other formal regulations in 
China, might not always be followed as they were once expected to. 
 
 
5.5 Hypothesis 4 
 
The more non-member debt capital an agricultural cooperative has, the less the cooperative 
will be perceived as working for the interests of the members.  
 
Hypothesis 4 has a connection with the third hypothesis. It concerns whether members’ 
interests would be less prioritized after acquisition of debt capital. Our assumption was that 
the more debt capital a cooperative has, the less the members’ interests will be prioritized. 
The interview questions that are asked to test this hypothesis are:  
 
1. What are the members’ biggest interests in your cooperative? 
2. Do the debt providers give their opinions and advices when the management is 
making important decisions? How do you handle it? 
3. How has the management’s ambition to expand the cooperative changed after 
receiving debt capital?   
4. Have you noticed any changes (strategically or managerially) in the operation of the 
cooperative since the involvement of debt capital? How have the members interpreted 
and reacted to these changes?   
5. Is one of the incentives that made the members joining the cooperative that it might 
reduce the risks of the farmers’ overall farming activities?  
6. Do you think that the debt capital increases the risks that the cooperative is exposed 
to?   
7. Which activities have been financed by debt capital?  
 
As discussed in the analysis of hypothesis 3, debt capital can have both positive and negative 
influences on level of member control in agricultural cooperatives. Similarly, debt capital’s 
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effects on member interests’ superiority in cooperatives should also be evaluated from 
different perspectives in order to reach more comprehensive conclusions. 
Acquisition of debt capital has allowed the cooperatives to have higher ambitions to expand 
their businesses, which means that their businesses became more and more complex. As the 
cooperatives have to be involved in more complicated problems and decisions, the members 
in these cooperatives are no longer able to have the same influential role in the decision-
making processes as they had before. In other words, the control of the cooperative will be 
more concentrated in the hands of the managers who use to be considered as more capable to 
handle more difficult business challenges.  
According to Gray (1998) and Bhuyan (2007), such a decreasing level of member control 
might increase the risk that members’ interests would be less prioritized. However, this 
statement concerning the relationship between member control and priority of members’ 
interests was only partly supported by our interviewees. Their answers indicated as long as 
the expansion is driven by the individual member’s interests, decreased member control might 
not always mean that member interests will be more ignored or less prioritized.  
However, lenders’ influences on members’ interests should not be underestimated either, 
especially if the debt capital is provided by private lenders. Even though our interviewees did 
not give any concrete examples of any conflicting interests between their members and the 
lenders, they emphasized that it is up to the managers to make sure that all the decisions 
should be made based on the members’ interests. As we mentioned before, it is more common 
that private lenders try to involve themselves in the cooperatives’ decision-making process. 
The members’ interests could be violated if the managers cannot handle the lenders’ 
influences in an appropriate way in which the members’ interests can be protected. In the long 
run, such a skift of control from the members to the lenders and managers could, according to 
the agency theory, deepen the principal-agent problem in which the managers’ ambitions 
gradually recede from the members’ interests 
When it comes to debt capital from financial institutions, negative impacts on the superiority 
of members’ interests might be much more limited. Thanks to the financial institutions’ 
constant supervision of the cooperatives’ operations including their democratic governance 
situation, the internal system and routines for member control and participation might be even 
more transparent and regularized than before. In other words, even though debt capital from 
financial institutions will also cause more complicated business activities that are difficult for 
the members to influence, the members will at least have better platforms where they can 
declare their interests and remind the management what should be prioritized. Under such 
circumstances, managers’ awareness and understanding about their members’ true interests 
would probably not be negatively affected despite decreased level of member control. 
According to the agent theory, some of the answers also indicated that the debt capital has 
caused a bigger horizon problem among the managers and members in some cooperatives. At 
the same time as the managers started spending the borrowed money for the cooperative’s 
long-term expansion, some of the members still prefer to get more money in the end of the 
year instead. The horizon problem could also arise considering that the debt capital gave the 
managers a new planning horizon based on the repayment plan which might not always match 
the members’ plans and therefore interests.  
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The reason that a part of the members’ control shifted to the managers after acquiring more 
debt capital was that the members’ started having difficulties to understand the increasingly 
complex business problems and decisions. Considering that the members’ biggest interest 
used to be increasing their incomes, it does make sense that the control of the cooperative 
becomes more concentrated on those people who have relatively more competences and 
therefore bigger opportunities to make the expansion as beneficial as possible for the 
members. From this perspective, a shift of controlling power from the members to the 
managers could in some cases be good for the members’ interests.  
In addition to that the managers are more capable to make good decisions, some special 
factors make the managers more reliable to work for the members’ interests. First, the 
majority of the managers in these seven cooperatives are also members and these managers 
used to have very similar farming activities at home as all other members. Second, it is very 
common that once one of the family relatives joins a cooperative, many of the other relatives 
will follow. In a country as China where family harmony, social connections and personal 
reputation are very important, an involvement of the managers’ family members and relatives 
in the cooperative further increases the incentives for the managers to make decisions that are 
best for their members.  
Considering all these special characteristics that we found in the interviewees’ answers, it is 
more likely that these managers will understand the members’ interests compared to if the 
managers were more professional in doing business but without local connections. These 
special characteristics of the Chinese agricultural cooperatives might, to a certain extent, 
alleviate principal-agent problem and horizon problem in which the understanding of 
members’ interests has a key role. However, even though it is important to have an 
understanding about farmers’ interests, it will be more and more difficult to run the 
cooperative business without professional management skills and experiences.  
 “All the managers in our cooperative are also members in the cooperative and many of them 
are also living on the same farming activities as our other members. In order to have a leader 
role in the village, it’s very important to have local connections with both farmers and 
authorities. However, I partly agree with those experts who have said that agricultural 
cooperatives in China should hire more professional and competent managers, but I am 
afraid that it will take a very long time to achieve that.” (Liu, 2012) 
 
“Most agricultural cooperatives do not have resources to have professional managers with a 
good education and experiences. What we and many other cooperatives in this area do is that 
we try to find candidates from our members or the members’ relatives. For example, if some 
member has a relatively good education or is good at using computers, then that person might 
be suggested as a candidate for secretarial duties or as accountant. If someone has 
connections with local authorities and is good at making relationships, then he can do the 
marketing. This is also how we used to select the board members.” (Manager B, 2012) 
 
“It is not easy to find people with enough competences and experiences among the local 
farmers, especially when the cooperative’s requirements on its managers keep increasing as 
the business grows larger.” (Gen, 2012) 
 
 “Different from other cooperatives, our members are not only represented by the board 
members. We adopted a system in which every ten members will have one member 
representing them in the routine meetings that will be arranged every month. The intension 
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was of course that our members could be more informed about the business and that it will be 
easier to speak out for them. But of course the loan from the cooperative bank was not the 
only reason that we started doing like this. As our cooperative’s business became more 
serious and the capital grew much larger, we had to have a more standardized and structured 
democratic governance system.” (Chong, 2012) 
  
Considering the risks that used to be connected with debt capital and most farmers’ risk-
averse nature, we also assumed that members’ interests might have been overlooked when 
cooperative managers make decisions to acquire debt capital. The single biggest interest for 
the members when they join the cooperatives is to increase incomes. In accordance with 
Hendrikse (1998), none of the interviewees denied that borrowing money from external 
financiers might cause higher risks for the cooperative and therefore the members. But, as it 
has been mentioned in the analysis of the first hypothesis, the members are not worried about 
the risks since they have trust on the managers that they are capable to handle the risks. Such 
behavior of the members confirms one of the core ideas of the social capital theory that the 
members will support and be commited to the managers’ decisions only when they trust on 
the managers. Additionally, a majority of the interviewees seem to share the opinion that this 
kind of risk-taking has been absolutely necessary in order to have enough capital to prioritize 
some of their members’ biggest interests, not least when it comes to increasing their incomes 
and minimizing risks of their farming activities.   
 
“I think a very common view among our members is that it could be even more risky for them 
if they invest their own money in a cooperative instead of just being a member in a 
cooperative that has debt capital.” (Qi, 2012) 
 
 “Everything can be a risk, without taking these risks (debt capital) that we know we can 
handle; we will have much more limited opportunities to help our members to eliminate the 
risks that can be much more problematic for them.” (Qi, 2012) 
 
“Talking about reducing risks, one of the strongest incentives for the farmers to join our 
cooperatives is that we can provide our members a much more stable and favorable price for 
their products. Our cooperative always tries to pay higher prices than the market price. Last 
year when the market price for vegetables was very low, we still offered our members a 
protection price for their deliveries, which was much higher than the market price.” 
(Manager A, 2012) 
 
“The worst thing that can happen to a farmer is to see all the vegetables he has grown rotting 
in the field when the farmer cannot find anyone to buy them. Farmers can be protected from 
this kind of risks by being a part of a cooperative. For instance, our members can always sell 
their vegetable to us as long as they do not exceed the amount that we inform them in 
advance. It also means that our members do not need to spend time and money on finding 
buyers themselves; the cooperative has more resources and will do it for them, the farmers 
can focus on what they do best instead.” (Liu, 2012) 
 
“There is no doubt that debt capital itself means higher risks, but a significant part of this 
money is used to help our members to reduce their risks. One of the important services we 
provide our members to reduce their risks is that we actively search for the most up-to-date 
market information and professional forecasts. These materials will all be shared with our 
members so they can make better decisions, for example which types of vegetables they 
should not grow in order to avoid excessive supply in the mark.” (Chong, 2012) 
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“Every time we have experienced high instabilities in the market, we will have more farmers 
who would like to join our cooperative.” (Xue, 2012) 
 
 
However, we found that the hypothesis 4 is partly supported. It might be argued whether all 
expansions are good or necessary for members’ personal interests. If usage of debt capital 
only causes increased financial risks or/and decreased member control but no or 
disproportionally little additional benefits to individual farmers, debt capital might be, in such 
cases, considered as having negative effects on members’ interests and therefore decreased 
commitments to their cooperative.  
 
 
5.6 Hypotehesis 5 
 
The more non-member debt capital an agricultural cooperative has, the less social capital 
this cooperative will have 
 
Our last hypothesis concerns the relationship between debt capital and social capital, which is 
another type of capital that is important for agricultural cooperatives’ performances. The 
amount of social capital is indicated by the level of members’ trust on managers, member 
participation, relationships and other social factors. Our assumption was that the more debt 
capital an agricultural cooperative has, the lower the social capital is in this cooperative. The 
interview questions that are asked to test this hypothesis are:  
 
1. How has the debt capital affected the level of financial risk that the cooperative is 
exposed to?   
2. Why did you join the cooperative? Is it important for you that your membership in the 
cooperative can help you to reduce the risks of your overall farming activity?  
3. Have you adjusted your way of working with your cooperative and your own farm 
business after the increase of debt capital and the risks it causes?   
4. How do the communication routines work in your cooperative? How is the 
relationship between managers and members? Compare to when debt capital was not 
available  
5. Do the members have opinions about how to use the borrowed money?   
6. How much can the members influence the decisions now, compared to when no debt 
capital was involved?   
 
According to the social capital theory, the amount of social capital in agricultural cooperatives 
is dependent on the level of trust, member participation, satisfaction, relationships and other 
social factors. As we have seen in the analysis of other hypotheses, debt capital seems to have 
very different effects even when it comes to social capital.   
 
We can find details from the interview answers indicating that debt capital could have some 
negative effects on social capital in agricultural cooperatives. For example, based on the 
answers we discussed in previous discussions, the debt capital is usually used to finance the 
cooperatives’ expansions, which means that the business and decisions will become more and 
more complex. Consequently, the level of member control in many cooperatives decreased 
because of members’ inability to understand the business and decisions as they once did. 
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Except that, we also discussed in hypothesis 4 that the the members’ control of their 
cooperative have, in varying degrees, decreased caused by the external lenders’ involvement. 
 
According to the social capital theory, the members’ participation in the control of the 
cooperative creates an important platform for the members and managers to communicate 
with each other and therefore build up social capital in form of close social relationship and 
trust (Paldam and Svendsen, 2000). In other words, a weaker member control will, in the long 
run, negatively affect the level of the social capital in the cooperative. The social capital 
theory also explains that the social capital might also be undermined if the management 
underprioritizes the members’ interests which has been discussed in hypothesis 4.  
 
Communication between managers and members is a key factor that determines the amount 
of social capital in agricultural cooperatives. Effective communication routines provide 
important platforms on which members and managers can exchange opinions and information 
with each other and thereby build up close relationships. A more blocked communication 
channel makes it harder for managers to gain social capital in the form of understanding and 
trust between the members and the managers. All our interviewees claimed that 
communication between managers and members is highly important but five of them also said 
that the communication routines have not been updated after the acquisition of debt capital.  
 
Considering the increasingly complex business that these cooperatives are engaged in, due to 
their debt capital, we have reasons to believe that the members in these cooperatives will have 
an increased need of information and communication in order to have a chance to grasp the 
cooperative’s business. In other words, the members’ decreased ability to understand and 
influence the cooperative’s business requires improved communication routines from the 
management which can be used by the managers to inform and explain and, by the members, 
to express their interests.  
 
In the longer perspective, debt capital’s negative impact on social capital can be worse if the 
communication routines do not adapt to the more complex business. The members will simply 
feel that they do not know what is going on in their cooperative and the managers and 
members will be further away from each other in their relationship. According to the social 
capital theory, such a weakened social realtionship increases the risk of both principal-agent 
problem and free-rider problem in the cooperative. However, managers in cooperatives might 
be, for a short time, able to satisfy their members despite a concentrated control of the 
decisions. But according to the member control principle such member satisfaction could be 
difficult to maintain over a longer period of time without allowing members to participate. 
 
“The communication between our managers and members has been following same routines 
for long time. Our managers will make most decisions; member meetings will make only big 
decisions.” (Xue, 2012) 
 
“Debt capital has not affected the communications between the managers and members in 
our cooperative.” (Gen, 2012) 
 
Member trust is another measure that indicates level of social capital in agricultural 
cooperatives. Members’ trust in their managers might be undermined if they experience that 
their cooperative no longer consider members’ interests as first priorities. As we discussed 
before, debt capital from private lenders can have negative impacts on members’ interests 
considering lenders’ involvements in the decision making processes. It is up to the managers 
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to handle the influence from the lenders so members’ interests would not be violated and 
therefore lose their trust in the management. 
  
Three of the interviewees said that most borrowed money is used to buy their members’ 
products. In such cases, debt capital enables the cooperatives to have enough money to pay to 
their member, which means immediate benefits to the members. The member satisfaction 
generated from such concrete profits will result in higher social capital in the cooperatives. 
On the other hand, four other interviewees said that their debt capital has been mainly used 
for more long-term investments. Considering that most cooperative members regard an 
increased income as their most important goal, their trust and relationship to the management 
might be damaged if the debt capital is used on more long-term investments instead of 
generating short-term benefits to the members. 
 
“For example, a part of our loans has been used to fulfill the requirements for, in the future, 
applying for the certification so called “Chinese famous brand”, what I can say is that not all 
our members were convinced that this is a necessary expense for our cooperative. (Liu, 
2012)” 
 
“Our member-invested capital is far from enough to pay our members when they, sometime in 
very short period, all want to sell their grapes to us. (Manager A, 2012)” 
 
 
Table 2: Summary of the results of the hypotheses 
 
 
Hypotheses 
 
 
Summary the results 
1) The more non-member debt capital an 
agricultural cooperative has, the less 
financial contributions the members will 
make to the cooperative.  
 
Partly Supported 
2) The more debt capital an agricultural 
cooperative has the more benefits members 
will get from their cooperative. 
 
Supported 
3) The more non-member debt capital an 
agricultural cooperative has the lower is the 
level of member control participation in the 
cooperative 
 
Partly Supported 
4) The more non-member debt capital an 
agricultural cooperative has, the less the 
cooperative will be perceived as working for 
the interests of the members 
 
Partly Supported 
5) The more non-member debt capital an 
agricultural cooperative has, the less social 
capital this cooperative will have 
 
 
Partly Supported 
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6. Conclusions 
 
Our aim in this study is to explain how debt capital influences members’ commitment to their 
agricultural cooperative. Based on the theoretical discussion and conclusion, we selected five 
key elements from the theories to measure debt capital’s impact on member commitment and 
they were member control, social capital, superiority of members’ interests, members’ 
benefits and members’ willingness to invest in the cooperatives. Five hypotheses were 
formulated based on these five indicators in order to find out how debt capital affects member 
commitment in agricultural cooperatives. Based on the analysis of the empirical data and 
hypotheses in the previous chapter, the conclusions will now be presented in order to reach 
the aim of our study. 
 
According to the interviewees, the main characteristic features of debt capital that can affect 
member commitment in agricultural cooperatives are: influences from lender, financial risks 
and enlargement of capital basis. These factors can have both positive and negative effects on 
level of member commitment in agricultural cooperatives.  
 
Influences from lenders 
 
All seven interviewees confirmed that their cooperatives have been, in different ways, 
influenced by their lenders. It seems like private lenders can have more negative effects on 
member commitment than institutional lenders such as commercial and cooperative banks. 
The private lenders’ influences on cooperatives are normally based on their personal interests 
instead of the members’. Such influences from private lenders might, according to the social 
capital theory, damage members’ commitment in the form of trust to their cooperative since 
part of members’ control over the cooperative will be shifted to the lenders. On the other 
hand, the size of the members’ dissatisfaction about their decreased control was much more 
limited than what we expected. The answers from the interviewees indicated that the member 
commitment in Chinese agricultural cooperatives is more dependent on the members’ trust in 
their managers and the personal benefits that the members can get from the cooperative.  
 
In addition, influences from private lenders might undermine the superiority of members’ 
interests and it increases the risks that members’ commitment to the cooperative will be 
weakened. However, such negative effects on member commitment might be avoided or 
reduced if the managers are able to handle the influences from the lenders in a proper way so 
they would not be violating members’ interests.  
 
Except private lenders, debt capital from financial institutions seems to have much less 
negative impacts on member commitment. Most of their influences on cooperatives might be 
perceived as positive for member commitment in agricultural cooperatives. Before approving 
the loans, most of these financial institutions such as commercial or cooperative banks, will 
have requirements on the cooperatives, not least when it comes to the democratic governance 
system in the cooperative. Even after the approval of the loan, the cooperatives will be 
monitored and supervised by these institutional lenders, which means that the managers of the 
cooperatives need to do regular reports to the banks about the cooperative’s operation. In the 
long run, financial institutions’ influences on agricultural cooperatives might be helping them 
to build up more sufficient and regularized democratic governance routines with higher 
member control and participation.  
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Increased financial risks 
 
The interviewees agreed that debt capital, to varying degrees, increases the financial risks for 
their cooperatives. However, whether such increased financial risks would weaken members’ 
commitment is, according to the interviewees, more dependent on trust, personal relationship, 
reputation and other forms of social capital between members and managers. A strong social 
capital in cooperatives would reduce the probability that risk-averse members will be less 
committed to the cooperative when facing increased risks. 
 
Except social capital, the majority of our interviewees also claimed that the risks that are 
attached to the debt capital will not have any significant impacts on the members’ 
commitment as long as the members feel that they will be further benefited from it. 
 
Enlargement of capital basis  
 
Debt capital enlarges agricultural cooperatives’ capital basis and enables them to expand. All 
seven interviewees claimed that debt capital has been extremely important for them in order 
to keep a high level of satisfaction among their members. The new business opportunities, 
new system for sharing information and higher purchasing prices have generated more 
concrete benefits to the members of these cooperatives thanks to the debt capital. From this 
point of view, debt capital definitely has positive effects on members’ commitment as long as 
the expansions are driven by the individual member’ interests.   
 
Unfortunately, cooperatives’ investments in increasingly fast expansions can have negative 
impacts on member commitment in indirect ways, especially if debt capital comes from 
private lenders. According to those interviewees who have used their debt capital to reach 
higher expansions, such growth has sometimes led to more complex businesses and decisions, 
which makes it more difficult for the members to participate in the governance of the 
cooperative. Such a more concentrated control of cooperatives would damage member 
commitment because of smaller opportunity to build trust with managers. According to 
agency theory, such negative change might also be perceived as an additional risk for having 
information asymmetry in the cooperative.  
 
For those cooperatives that have used debt capital mainly to pay higher prices to their 
members or provide other types of financial supports, the business might not be more 
complicated than before. Thereby, the members will not have problems to continue having the 
control and understanding about their cooperatives as they had before. According to the 
answers from those cooperatives using debt capital from banks, the member control might be 
decreased because of the expansion of the business but it does not mean that member’ 
interests has to be more ignored thanks to the banks’ constant supervision and inspection of 
the cooperative. Considering most members’ hope for short-term and quick profits, debt 
capital’s positive effects on member commitment might not be as expected if they are spent 
on long-term investments. 
 
The general conclusion is that debt capital can have a multi-dimensioned set of effects on 
agricultural cooperatives, which can lead to both positive and negative changes in the level of 
member commitment. Debt capital’s effects should be evaluated in the consideration of its 
source, how it has been used and other conditions in order to reach relevant and 
comprehensive results. The conclusions we had should probably not be generalized in other 
contexts considering the specific tradition and culture the interviewees were chosen from. It is 
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important to keep in mind that member commitment in Chinese agricultural cooperatives 
seems to be overwhelmingly dependent on social capital such as members’ trust on their 
managers and the amount of benefits that members can get from the cooperatives. A stronger 
demand of higher member control among the members would have probably resulted in 
different conclusions. 
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Appendix – Question guide 
 
 
1. What are the incentives for the farmers to join your cooperative? 
2. Are there any members being concerned about that the cooperative might have 
difficulties to make repayments and fulfill other terms of the loans?   
3. Do the lenders’ influences on the cooperative business affect the members’ 
willingness to make financial contributions to the cooperative? 
4. How do you think the cooperative’s dependence on the members’ investments has 
changed after acquiring debt capital?  
5. How often have the members made investments in the cooperative compare to the 
time without debt capital? 
6. How has the acquisition of debt capital contributed to the financial performance and 
results of the cooperative?   
7. How has the members been benefited by the acquisition of debt capital so far? Give 
examples. 
8. How engaged are the members when it comes to seeking information, attending 
meetings and express their opinions? Compare to before debt, why?   
9. How much can the members influence the decisions now compared to when no debt 
capital was involved?   
10. What are the members’ views on the risks that are attached with the debt capital of 
your cooperative?   
11. Do the lenders give their opinions and advices about the operation of the cooperative? 
How does the management handle them?  
12. Except the possible influence from the lenders, any changes in the operation or 
strategy in order to adapt to the terms attached to it (e.g. repayment and interests)?  
13. Do the members have opinions about how to use the borrowed money?   
14. What are the members’ biggest interests in agricultural cooperatives? 
15. Do the debt providers give their opinions and advices when the management making 
important decisions? How do you handle it? 
16. How has the management’s ambition to expand the cooperative changed after 
receiving debt capital?   
17. Have you noticed any changes (strategically or managerially) in the operation of the 
cooperative since the involvement of debt capital? How have the members interpreted 
and reacted to these changes?   
18. Is one of the incentives that made the members joining the cooperative that it might 
reduce the risks of the farmers’ overall farming activities?  
19. Do you think that the debt capital increases the risks that the cooperative is exposed 
to?   
20. Which activities have been financed by debt capital?  
21. How has the debt capital affected the level of financial risk that the cooperative is 
exposed to?   
22. Why did you join the cooperative? Is it important for you that your membership in the 
cooperative can help you to reduce the risks of your overall farming activity?  
23. Have you adjusted your way of working with your cooperative and your own farm 
business after the increase of debt capital and the risks it causes?   
24. How do the communication routines work in your cooperative? How is the 
relationship between managers and members? Compare to when debt capital was not 
available  
